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Solving the Navy Math Problem

Solving the Navy Math Problem

The U.S. Navy and Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro are having a serious math problem.  Their challenge appears to be the rule of proportions in regards to their crisis in shipbuilding.  For submarines, it revolves around new construction and maintenance of the existing fleet.  The proper basic throughput calculation for new construction is dependent upon the “as is/to be” state of two facilities: HII/NNS (Huntington Ingalls Industries/Newport News Shipyard) in Virginia and GD/EB (General Dynamics/Electric Boat) in Connecticut.

The Navy’s goal is 2.33 new attack boats/per year; they are receiving 1.3. I.e., they are going backwards in the math.  However, 2.33 does not account for the new Columbia Class Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarine Production, any other large diameter submarines needed (such as replacements for the four converted Ohio Class Submarines used for SEALS and Tomahawks), nor five Virginia nuclear attack submarines being taken from the inventory and sold to Australia.  Thus, the real, annual throughput of submarines needed is more like 3.2 (that’s my estimate).

The Navy is proposing a “pass” in the Fiscal Year 2025 request where they go down to one (1) attack boat and instead bestow those funds to the amphibious force for a new purchase of a large San Antonio LPD. The Navy amphibious force is in disarray as the Navy ignores the Marine Corps requirements and Army Staff remembers that they had/have a Joint Theater Watercraft support mission. Better to have the Generals and Admirals argue over landing craft than control of the atomic mission.

Since the Navy has lost the art and science and math, I, an Army Colonel will solve this math for the Navy with half my brain tied behind my back (hat tip to Rush):

There, I have solved the Navy’s math problem.  All things being equal, the Navy needs 4.92 shipyards involved in Submarine production to deliver 3.2 submarines a year.  We can round this to an even five shipyards.  The real answer will depend on several factors, but no matter how efficient NNS and EB are, and they are good, something has to change to hit a delivery mark of 3.2 submarines per year which means significant more production acreage.  This same law of proportions can be used to solve the Navy’s submarine maintenance crisis, the growing delays in frigate production, Arleigh Burke Destroyer production, etc.

South Carolina as a starting point

No matter how many O-6s through O-10s and political appointees stare at the Excel spreadsheet of the five-year Navy shipbuilding plan or lecture industry on profits, it’s not going to get better until a disruptive event occurs.  Disruptive can be a good thing like new shipyards, it doesn’t have to be a war, this may prevent a war. This Navy challenge with math is baffling; I don’t know if this math challenge is related to the Navy dropping standards for joining, CRT, DEI, or asbestos.

It is intuitive that additional yards need to be added to the partnering arrangement between HII/NNS and GD/EB where they barge major assemblies to one another. The arrangement is sound and logical, but simply not keeping up with throughput.

The answer is disruptive – as a starting point, add a third yard, close by that can participate in the barging arrangement (I helped load Crowley 4x1s for a season so have an affinity for the barging arrangement).

A logical candidate – resurrect the Charleston, South Carolina Naval Shipyard – at a close by location as a greenfield (i.e. totally fresh start), modern, state of the art facility. Get an Army General to run a Manhattan like effort to do the Civil Engineering in a Government Owned/Contractor Operated facility post haste upriver from the original Charleston Naval Shipyard.

Another new facility in the Gulf Region which is modernizing significantly is Austal in Mobile, Alabama.  They would be an ideal yard for even greater expansion to help in production of the new Constellation Frigate and also other ships.

 

Washington State along the Columbia River

New production of submarines is currently clustered on the East Coast.  However, new greenfield facilities on the West Coast can be of great assistance in addressing the maintenance throughput on all vessel types as well as new construction of frigates, destroyers, support vessels, and perhaps most importantly, autonomous vessels.  On the West Coast, there are not many options for a new yard without massive Federal eminent domain claims of land and terraforming/backfilling of coastal harbors on a scale not seen recently in America.  A possible site is the Vigor main shipyard in Portland Oregon; however, this facility is relatively boxed in by urban development and has little room for growth.  A new site downriver on the Columbia River, closer to where it meets the Pacific Ocean, makes sense.

Land acquisition, expansion, and outfitting for a close-by satellite yard would be a large undertaking and not helped by the strangulation of regulatory oversight by the Blue regimes dominating at the state and Local level, but the national urgency is a compelling necessity.

There are three places along the Columbia River in Washington State (Congressional District WA-3) that would be ideal for new, state-of-the art shipbuilding, and repair facilities.  These are Chinook, Oneida, and Longview, Washington.  These new facilities, like the Austal facility in Mobile, Alabama could be as automated, and AI enabled as much as possible for maximum efficiency.  All work should be done inside enclosed, climate controlled, 72-degree facilities that provide far greater worker safety, efficiency, and privacy from prying eyes.

A second drydock in the Pacific that can handle a carrier is needed – currently, there is only one and the Navy can’t figure out whether it is safe to use and it needs substantive work to handle a Ford Class aircraft carrier.  The construction of a super-size covered drydock should also be implemented at these new Columbia River facilities.

 Vertical integration with key partners like the PI, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan

Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro can’t figure out whether he’s Trumpian or Red Brandon.  He provides leadership on ship construction not seen since the Reagan days, then reverts to berating shipbuilders for daring to yield profits.  Maybe he’s been talked to.  He has now departed on a trip to Pacific Partner countries like South Korea and Japan which are world experts in efficient shipbuilding.  He should also visit the re-awakening yard in the Philippines which shows great potential as well as Taiwan that excels at shipbuilding.

The vertically integrated, internationally sourced, “Boeing-like” American final assembly of ships can yield incredible time and cost savings as the Maritime Administration just demonstrated.  The ships are being delivered on time, on budget – and getting little attention.  Might be because it started as a Trump initiative.  Regardless of who gets credit, this is a model for a leap ahead for solving the Navy’s problems while returning America to an era of maritime leadership.  We just need to find the right Army General to run this massive planning and civil engineering exercise for the Navy to help Navy Secretary Del Toro solve the Navy math problem.

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Author: John Mills