How Three Judges Dismantled a Federal Indictment: Judicial Overreach in United States v. Comey

By Ronda Kennedy. Esq.and Cara Castronuova

The American public expects prosecutors to prove cases and defendants to challenge them. But in United States v. James B. Comey Jr., something very different occurred. A federal grand jury voted to indict the former FBI Director on two felony counts — and then three federal judges unraveled that indictment through conjecture, media narratives, personalized attacks on the United States Attorney, and procedural anomalies that have no precedent in federal criminal practice.

Together, they reveal a pattern inconsistent with judicial neutrality, ethical obligations, and the constitutional role of the grand jury.

I. Judge Michael S. Nachmanoff: Bias, Media Reliance, and Hostility Toward the Prosecution

Judge Michael Nachmanoff began the case by introducing a loaded, political framing of the U.S. Attorney, Lindsey Halligan — a framing he created himself:

“So your view is that Ms. Halligan is a stalking horse or a puppet, for want of a better word, doing the president’s bidding?”

This is not neutral judicial questioning. It is an insinuation.

A. Reliance on newspaper accounts instead of evidence

Nachmanoff referenced news reporting as his factual basis:

“This was reporting that the president said the following…”

Judges cannot rely on external reporting. Canon 3 forbids it. But this reporting shaped his skepticism toward DOJ’s independence.

B. One-sided interruptions

When prosecutors attempted to explain the internal process at DOJ:

“Well, let me just stop you there—”

The Government was repeatedly interrupted.
The defense was not.

C. Silencing the US Attorney and misstating the record

When Halligan attempted to correct the judge’s misunderstanding:

“You may sit down.”

The Government then filed a NOTICE CORRECTING THE RECORD, because the judge’s recounting of the grand-jury events was factually wrong.

D. Prejudging prosecutorial independence

Most concerning was Nachmanoff’s statement that he would struggle to find independence even if Halligan asserted it under oath:

“Given the sequence of events in the short time, it would be very difficult for the Court to make a finding of true independence objectively…”

This was a prejudgment — not a finding based on evidence.

II. Judge Cameron McGowan Currie: Out-of-District Intervention, Media Dependence, and Personal Attacks

Senior Judge Cameron Currie of South Carolina — sitting by designation — dismissed the indictment outright.

A. Personal, demeaning commentary

Her written opinion described Halligan as:

“a White House aide who has no prosecutorial experience”

This was not legal reasoning; it was character belittlement.

B. Reliance on press reporting as evidence

Defense counsel noted:

“the same question that was asked last week by Judge Currie…”

This followed a reference to “abundant newspaper reporting.” Like Nachmanoff, Currie drew from media accounts, not evidence.

C. A judge from another state overturned a Virginia indictment

Currie’s signature block reads:

“Sitting by Designation, Columbia, South Carolina.”

There is no explanation for why a dispositive constitutional motion in the Eastern District of Virginia was routed to a judge located hundreds of miles away in another state.

This created the unmistakable appearance of forum shopping or judge selection.

Federal courts take extraordinary care to avoid even appearances of judge-shopping, especially in politically sensitive cases. That care was absent here.

A dispositive ruling in a high-profile criminal case was made:
•    outside the district,
•    by a judge with no connection to the venue,
•    with no record explanation for the assignment,
•    and with no indication that the presiding judge ever reviewed the grand-jury evidence.

The appearance of judge selection is unavoidable — and deeply problematic.

D. She dismissed the indictment contrary to the precedent she cited

Currie quoted United States v. Calandra:

“the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence…”

She then dismissed the indictment based on the character of the evidence and her own distrust of the process.

III. Magistrate Judge William G. Fitzpatrick: Distortion, Conjecture, False “Missing Minutes,” and Ethical Breaches

Of the three judges involved, Magistrate Judge Fitzpatrick’s actions represent the most extreme departure from judicial standards. His rulings were built on altered transcript context, invented suspicion, and full disregard of sworn clarifications.

A. Distorting grand-jury testimony by splitting a single continuous statement

The Government explains that Fitzpatrick did not simply misinterpret Halligan’s instruction—he rearranged it:

He “splits what was a single continuous statement into two parts,” creating a meaning “not present in the actual text.”

He took one uninterrupted instruction and treated the halves as independent, thereby manufacturing confusion.

B. The omitted part was “dispositive” — it proved the prosecutor acted correctly

In filings, the Government emphasizes the gravity of what Fitzpatrick excluded:

The portion he omitted was “dispositive of whether the prosecutor acted correctly,” showing she “gave the correct legal instruction.”

Thus, the very line that proved Halligan acted appropriately was the one Fitzpatrick left out.

C. Fitzpatrick’s conclusions were “unsound” and “distorted”

The Government’s language is unequivocal:

His analysis is “unsound” and the result “distorted.”

This was not a disagreement — it was a factual reconstruction that never occurred.

D. Violations of judicial canons

The record identifies explicit ethical breaches:

Canon 2(A) — integrity and avoidance of speculation

His findings rested on “conjecture rather than evidence.”

Canon 3(A)(4) — findings must be based only on the record

He “misstat[ed] or distort[ed] the record.”

E. The “missing minutes” theory was false — contradicted by the transcript and the court reporter

Fitzpatrick suggested a suspicious gap in the transcript between approximately 4:28 p.m. and 6:47 p.m.

But the Government explains:
•    This was grand-jury deliberation time, never transcribed.
•    The foreperson gave a sworn explanation.

What makes Fitzpatrick’s theory even more untenable is that it was contradicted by the court reporter herself. The Government notes that the time period Fitzpatrick flagged as suspicious was simply deliberation time, and that this fact “has been confirmed by the court reporter,” referencing her contemporaneous email, submitted as a government’s exhibit.

Despite knowing that juror deliberations are never recorded — and that the reporter confirmed no minutes were missing — Fitzpatrick continued treating the period as evidence of misconduct.

F. Ordering unprecedented disclosure of all grand-jury materials

Based on this distorted foundation, he ordered: “all grand jury materials,” including audio.

This extraordinary breach of secrecy was later stayed for lacking factual grounding.

G. Exceeding the district judge’s remand

The district judge remanded narrowly.
Fitzpatrick instead reopened the entire inquiry:

He exceeded the scope of the remand.

H. Fitzpatrick and Currie reviewed evidence the presiding judge never saw

Nothing in the record so far shows that Judge Nachmanoff ever reviewed the grand-jury transcript. Only Fitzpatrick, and Currie reviewed it.

This means that the judges least responsible for the case saw more evidence than the judge responsible for overseeing it.

IV. The Grand Jury’s Will Was Clear — and Ignored

The Notice Correcting the Record shows:

“We… want to true bill Counts Two and Three.”

Despite this:
•    Nachmanoff misstated the return
•    Fitzpatrick alleged nonexistent misconduct
•    Currie dismissed the indictment without addressing the evidence

The grand jury spoke.
The judges overruled them.

Over and over again, the record reads as if the bench was working harder than the defense to find reasons to doubt the case — volunteering new theories, new suspicions, and new obstacles the defense then adopted, rather than simply refereeing a fair contest between prosecution and defense.

Conclusion: The Indictment Did Not Fail – It Was Dismantled

This case did not collapse because of evidentiary weakness. It collapsed because of judicial bias.

At key moments, the judges themselves seemed to be generating more attacks on the case than the defense, supplying new doubts instead of simply weighing the ones raised by counsel.

This was not judicial review.
It was judicial dismantling.

If judicial integrity matters, what happened in United States v. Comey demands scrutiny, not silence.

Remember, in the end God wins!

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*Ronda Kennedy is an attorney who practices law in California and Nevada.

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